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MEGAN'S LA W
STEPHEN NEWMAN: Thank you, Professor Gibbons. The next
speaker is Professor Ronald K. Chen.
Prof Ronald K. Chen
RONALD K. CHEN: 5 Thank you very much. Like Ms.Grall, I am
very pleased to be speaking on these issues in an academic setting as a
law professor, and since there are so many of that species in the room,
I guess I will presume to speak for all of us. We are sometimes accused
of dealing with legal issues and propounding law, divorced from
practical impact or the needs of the community. It was, therefore, with
some trepidation that I accepted the appointment over a year ago to deal
with the issue that has become of such public concern since then.
I was assigned to represent Carlos Diaz," 6 whose main claim to
fame was that he was the subject of the first case in New Jersey in which
the constitutional challenge to Megan's Law was met.4t7 He was
convicted some ten years prior of the rape of an adult woman" He was
not convicted of an offense against a minor.4"9 He is not a pedophile.42°
I mention that merely to reinforce the scope of the statute. Even though
415 Assistant Professor, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey.
See Guy Sterling, Rapist Gains Temporary Ban on Megan's Law Notification,
STARLEDGER(Newark),Jan. 4, 1995, at 1. Ronald Chen was appointed special counsel to
Carlos Diaz by U.S. District Court Judge John Bissell. Id. at 7.
417 See Group Takes Megan's Law to Puerto Rico, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Jan.
10, 1995, at A5.
418 Id. (stating Diaz served 12 years for kidnapping and raping a 20-year-old
woman). See also Injunction on Megan's Law Brings Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at
B7.
419 See Group Takes Megan's Law to Puerto Rico, supra note 417.
420 See generally Montana, supra note 180, at 569 n.6 (quoting DAVID FINKELHOR,
A SOURCEBOOKON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 91 (1986) (defining a pedophile as "a person who
is sexually interested in children...")).
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Megan's Law is often thought of or perceived to be addressing the
problems of pedophilia, it, in fact, goes beyond that.42" '
By way of another example, in the case Doe v. Poritz,422 the one
that was eventually addressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, John
Doe, obviously not his real name, was convicted previously of an
offense against minors 23 He was adjudicated under a longstandingNew
Jersey criminal practice as a repetitive and compulsive offender424 and
committed to the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center, commonly called
Avenel.425
Unlike most of his fellow inmates, though, he was paroled from
Avenel.426 This is a relatively rare occurrence, which happens only after
a multi-tiered review 27 that is a more complicated process than the
parole procedures for someone committed to the general prison
population.428 After a finding that he had responded to treatment and
42' See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-1(a)(West 1995) (indicatingthat the high rate
of recidivism by sex offenders was another major concern in passing Megan's Law).
422 Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d 1335 (N.J. Super. Ct.), modified, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J.
1995).
423 Doe v. Poritz, 661 A.2d at 1337. Doe entered into a plea agreement after being
charged and indicted with molesting two teenage boys in June of 1985. Id.
424 Id. at 1338.
425 Lori N. Sabin, Note, Doe v. Poritz: A Constitutional Yield to an Angry Society,
32 CAL. W. L. REV. 331, 333 (1996). Doe was examined by a psychologist at Avenel and
found to have a pattern of repetitive and compulsive behavior and so was sentenced to a ten-
year term. Id.
426 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374. Most inmates at Avenel serve their maximum
sentences. Id. Doe was one of "the few who were released as 'capable of making an
acceptable social adjustment in the community'...." Id.
427 See Petrucelli,supra note 2, at 1130-32 (defining the three-tiered system of the
notification provision);, Michelle Ruess, Hard to Say Which Sex Offenders Pose Threat,
Experts Say, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Aug. 25, 1994, at A3 [hereinafter Sex Offenders
Pose Threat] ("[B]efore Avenel staff make a recommendation, they review the number of
crimes committed, the type of crime, and the offender's conduct in therapy .... ").
428 See Michelle Ruess, Many Sex Abusers Released Without Treatment, THE
RECORD (New Jersey), Feb. 25, 1995, at A12 [hereinafter Released Without Treatment]
(stating that sexual offenders sentenced to the general prison population are eligible for
parole sooner than those undergoing treatment at Avenel).
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was no longer a risk of re-offense, he was paroled from Avenel and has
been living in the community as a member of society since then.429
The statute thus applies not only to those, for instance, like the
accused killer of Megan Kanka, who was not paroled from Avenel but
simply had to be released because he had reached the maximum term of
his sentence,.3° but also to those whom the state has already determined
no longer pose such a risk.43' It also applies to those like Carlos Diaz,
who was never convicted of offenses involving pedophilia, which are a
large measure of the driving force behind the statute.432
Notably, about a year ago, when this case came before the
Federal District Court in New Jersey, Carlos Diaz was scheduled to be
released on January 1 st.433 At that time, the Attorney General's Office
and the Passaic County prosecutor had voluntarily agreed not to engage
in community notification because the Passaic County prosecutor had,
under the process that was then in effect, simply determined that he fell
429 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 380.
430 According to the chairman and other health care professionals at Avenel,
Timmendequas had "maxed out" his sentence and there was simply no legal basis for
keeping him there. Ruth Bonapace, Can Sex Offenders Really Be Cured?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
21, 1994, §13J at 1.
411 See Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d at 378. There is no provision in the Community
Notification Law for no-risk individuals. Id. All offenders, no matter how low the risk of
re-offense, are subject to at least Tier One notification. Id.
432 Carlos Diaz was convicted for kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault of a
20-year-old woman in 1983. Montana, supra note 180, at 574. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2C:7-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996). This section states that the New Jersey legislature
enacted Megan's Law to protect against sex offenders who commit predatory acts against
children. Id. The registration law covers those sex offenders convicted after the effective
date of the law as well as prior convicted offenders whose conduct was found "repetitive and
compulsive," regardless of whether the victim involved was a minor. Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d at 377.
The statute, and the wide public support it has received, appears to be motivated
specificallyby public outcry following the murder of 7-year-old Megan Kanka. Newman,
supra note 8, at 8. Artway, 81 F.3d 1235 at 1243 (stating that legislation rushed through as
an emergency measure in response to public outcry over girl's death); see also Montana,
supra note 180, at 571.
... Group Takes Megan's Law to Puerto Rico, supra note 417.
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within Tier Two.434 Tier Two entails a moderate risk of re-offense,
which involves notification to schools and victim support
organizations. 35
For a few days, the Attorney General's Office and the Passaic
County prosecutor voluntarily agreed to hold off because the New Year's
holiday intervened and we could not have a hearing in time.436 In the
meantime, however, the press found out Diaz's name and so, Carlos
Diaz's picture, a rather unflattering portrayal, was on the front page of
the (Newark, New Jersey) Star Ledger with a somewhat enhanced
description of what was going on."" This in some ways limited the
efficacy of any relief that could be granted by the district court.438 That
led to organizations such as the Guardian Angels patrolling the streets
of the town of Passaic and handing out leaflets with the picture, which
provided a phone number to call in the event someone saw this person.'39
The day Carlos Diaz was released he was staying at his mother's
apartment and was unable to go out on the streets:*° In addition, family
members got into fracases with members of the public, and for reasons
414 See Kenneth Crimaldi, Note, "Megan's Law:" Election-Year Politics and
Constitutional Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 169, 175 n.45 (1995); Bill Sanderson, Over 900
Offenders Registered in N.J., THE RECORD (New Jersey), Apr. 26, 1995, at Al.
435 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7-8(c) (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
436 Crimaldi,supra note 434, at 175; see also ChristopherKilbome, Federal Judge
Blocks Officials From Enforcing Megan's Law 'A Chilling Effect' Notification on Rapist
Barred, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Jan. 4, 1995, at Al.
4" Guy Sterling, Sex Offender Nearing His Release Will Be the First to Test
'Megan's Law', STAR LEDGER, Dec. 31, 1994, at I (statingcounsel appointed to the prisoner
will begin the court proceedings by asking the judge to keep the prisoner's name from
becoming public, however, the article named the prisoner by stating that "a spokesman for
the State Department of Corrections said the suit challenging Megan's Law had been filed
by Carlos Diaz").
438 Id.
439 lvette Mendez, State Will Challenge Judge's Bar of Enforcement on Megan's
Law, STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 6, 1995.
"1 Malcolm Gladwell, N.J. Law on Released Sex Offenders Proves Problematic;
Ex-Inmates Must Report Addresses, but Enforcement is Burdensome; Some are Harassed,
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1995, at A6.
[Vol. XllI
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obviously unrelated to what was going on in the streets, Diaz left very
quickly and has since permanently relocated outside the state.44
It is also well known, but Professor Gibbons will tell me if I am
wrong, that Alexander Artway, because he would have been required to
register,442 also relocated outside the state.443 The latter raises questions
that requires some discussion: what is going to be the practical effect of
community notification? 444 Will it simply cause offenders to either go
underground or go toother jurisdictions? 445 And if that is the effect,
what is the real benefit to the public by simply shifting the problem to
make it someone else's problem?
Going back to the theme of being a law professor out of touch
with community concerns, part of the problem in thiscase are at least
some of the constitutional issues that are involved: the Ex Post Facto
Clause,446 the Bill of Attainder Clause,447 and to some extent the Double
" Steve Chambers, A Public Safeguard . . . or Cruel Punishment? Law
Enforcement, Civil Libertarians Continue Debate Over Registration STAR LEDGER, July 26,
1995.
442 SeeArtway876 F. Supp. at 670 ("[Hie is compelled to registerprior to midnight
on this date, February 28, 1995, or else face prosecution for a fourth degree felony").
44' See Chambers, supra note 44 1. "When Alexander Artway heard about Megan's
Law, the released sex offender took two steps. He filed a federal lawsuit against the state,
and he started making plans to move to New York." Id
.4 See Earl-Hubbard, supra note 4, at 824 (noting that "[a]uthorities have
documented numerous instances of vigilantism and attacks on registered offenders in the few
years the registration laws have been in effect").
"I See id (stating example of a sex offender who, after being harassed by
neighbors, relocated to a state with no registration laws).
4U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see also Collinsv. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41
(1990). The Court, in defining the boundaries of the Ex Post Facto Clause, stated that
"[ajlthough the Latin phrase 'ex post facto' literally encompasses any law passed 'after the
fact,' it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex post
facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantag the offender affected by them."
Id.
447 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §9, cl. 3; see also BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed.
1990) (defining bills of attainder as "legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial").
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Jeopardy Clause, although that has gotten certainly some attention in
recent Supreme Court cases.448 These are all very abstract concepts,
which, even in the firmament of constitutional protections, are not
exactly of the first magnitude to the same degree as, say, the First
Amendment44 9 or the Fourth Amendment.45  For that reason, the
members of the media repeatedly asked me about a year ago: "Is
Megan's Law constitutional?" I sat down and had to give them a long,
scholarly discussion, nuancing my answer-first of all, are we talking
about retroactive application? What is extent of the community
notification involved? Of course, after two seconds, with their eyes
glazed over, they repeated: "Well, just tell us, is Megan's Law
constitutional?" The answer to that question has sort of become the
symbol of judicial force that has been driving these issues, and it is
simply not capable of a quick 'yes' or 'no' answer in the way that they
would like it.
This is really no one's fault. My observation is that there is a
very serious, in this case more serious than usual, dislocation and
disparity between common expectations of the way the judicial process
44 "No person... shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 (1994)
(holding that the sentencing phase of a capital trial is not a successive prosecution that would
violate the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 684 (1993) (classifying
various proceedings as either in harmony with or in violation of the Fifth Amendment).
449 See, e.g., Carney R. Shegerian, A 'Sign of the Times: The United States Court
Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored Requirement for Time, Place and Manner
Restrictions, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 453, 471-72 (1992) (discussing what kind of speech is
protected by the First Amendment: "communicative expression in a pure state without
physical activity," "speech plus" which is a combination of speech and activity, and
"communicative activities that involve no verbal expression," such as saluting a flag).
450 See David A. Christensen, Warrantless Administrative Searches under
EnvironmentalLaws: The Limits to EPA Inspectors'StatutoryInvitatiot 26 ENVTL. L. 1019
(1996). "The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects citizens' privacy from
unreasonable searches and seizures that are unsupported by a warrant based on probable
cause .... The U.S. Supreme Court extended this general rule to protect business owners
and operators because they also have an expectation of privacy against unreasonable
administrative searches of their commercial property." Id. at 1019.
[VOIL X1II
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should work and the way the process does work if the constitutional
proscriptions are being applied faithfully.5 For instance, the Ex Post
Facto Clause,452 as Professor Gibbons noted, would seem to be, on its
face, a fairly straightforward proscription.453 You may not impose a
punishment retroactively.454 On its face, and this is part of the topical
problem, it does not allow for inquiry into the nature of the offender or
the interests of the public in engaging in community notification.455
There is no way to balance the public interest or the dastardly nature of
the offender in that inquiry that caused a lot, and continues to cause a lot
of confusion as to what the constitutional issues that are currently before
the Court, particularly the Third Circuit, really are.456 For instance, let
4 William N. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988). "[T]here appears to be a
more systematic and open experimentation in judicial lawmaking than there is in legislative
lawmaking, because of the hierarchical structure of the federal court system." Id. at 307.
"Legal issues may first be treated by district and circuit courts, which justify their positions
by setting forth rationales in published opinions." Id.
452 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. I ("[N]o state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto
law .... ); see also BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990) (defining an expostfacto
law as "a law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal consequences of relations of such fact or deed").
411 Sheldon D. Pollack, Constitutional Interpretation as Political Choice, 48 U.
PITT. L. REv. 989, 997 (1987) (discussingChief Justice Marshall's observations in Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), that "expostfacto laws.., involves a literal invoking of the
text").
... See, e.g., Schopf, supra note 12, at 133-34 (stating that "[rieleased offenders
suddenly subject to community notification laws may claim that at the time of their
incarceration no law existed requiring them, as a result of their crime, to register and face the
sanction of community notification").
455 But see Steven P. Bann, Sex Offenders-Megan'sLaw, N.J.L.J., Aug. 12, 1996,
at 61 (stating, in evaluating Megan's Law against due process rights, ajudicial hearing will
compare, among other things, private and public interests).
456 See, e.g., Schopf, supra note 12, at 118 (stating that the community notification
provision of Megan's Law has been subject to considerableconstitutional controversy). The
Third Circuit has dealt with the topic of community notification in four cases: Aflway v.
Attorney Gen. of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp.
1187 (D. N.J. 1996); C.P.M.v. D'llio, 916 F. Supp. 415 (D. N.J. 1996); E.B. v. Poritz, 914
F. Supp. 85 (D. N.J. 1996).
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me quote some language from the opinion in Doe v. Poritz, in which the
Supreme Court stated:457 "[W]e sail on truly uncharted waters," 8 which
I think is already a somewhat candid admission for a Court to make:
[F]or no other state has adopted such a far-reaching
statute. All other notification statutes apparently make
public notification discretionary on the part of officials.
The statute before us, however, mandates it. Despite the
unavoidable uncertainty of our conclusion, we remain
convinced that the statute is constitutional. To rule
otherwise is to find that society is unable to protect itself
from sexual predators by adopting this simple remedy of
informing the public of their presence. 59
This seems to be a not completely successful veiled attempt to inject a
balancing inquiry. We can really do this if there is a good enough
reason for inquiry into a constitutional proscription that facially does not
admit itself of that type of rationalization.46 ° As we know, the New
Jersey Supreme Court is currently at some disagreement, not only as to
the result, but as to the methodology, of determining whether a
retroactive provision violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.46 Professor
Gibbons has already outlined our thinking on the operation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause,462 the Double Jeopardy Clause,463 and the Bill of
457 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
458 Id. at 422.
459 Id.
460 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §10, cl. 1.
"' See Sabin, supra note 425, at 356 (stating that "the Poritz Court justified the ex
post facto applicationto released offenders on the need for societal safety"). Judge Stein in
the Poritz dissent disagreed by stating, "[biecause the Community Notification Law 'makes
more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission,' I conclude that the law,
despite its understandable objectives, violates the constitutional prohibition against expost
facto laws." 662 A.2d at 424.
462 U.S. CONST. art I, §10, cl. 1.
463 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[Vol. XII
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Attainder Clause,4 64 all of which ask the question: "What constitutes
punishment for purposes of the Constitution?" '465 Our positions are
essentially coterminous on this matter. The New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted an analysis, although there will be others who can, in good faith,
try to characterize it otherwise, that essentially says: if the actual
subjective legislative motive was pure in that it did not intend to punish,
then it is not punishment. 66 The position of the federal courts, not only
on preliminary injunction, for instance, the Artway case, 67 was resolved
464 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (6th ed.
1990) (defining bill of attainder as "[I]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply
either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as
to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial").
4 See supra notes 358-60, and accompanying text.
" See Sabin, supra note 425, at 343. In performing an ex post facto analysis of
the registration and notification statutes in Megan's Law, the Poritz Court
focus[ed] on the purpose of the legislation. The
Court found if the statute imposed a disability for
the purpose of punishment-that is, to reprimand
the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it would be
considered penal. However, if it imposed a
disability not to punish but to accomplish some
other legitimate governmental purpose, then it
would not be considered penal for purposes of
constitutional analysis. Id.
461 Artway, 876 F. Supp. 666.
19971
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on a final adjudication on the merits, and that is what is on appeal now
to 'the Third Circuit.46 The federal courts have adopted a more
functional analysis that inquires, whether viewed from the historical
understandingor the functional effect of the statute, whether the sanction
in question effectively imposes punishment. 69 That determines whether
retroactive provision imposes new punishment for purposes of the Ex
Post Facto Clause, as well as others.47°
That is a very basic difference in methodology, and, in fact, it
almost transcends the issue of Megan's Law.47' I take the view very
strongly that whatever result you come out with, for purposes of
constitutional adjudication, you cannot simply rely upon the outward
facial pronouncements of the legislature's pure motive. And for those
reasons, I will venture to risk a prediction that, however it comes out, the
Third Circuit will at least inquire into the practical effects of community
notification. I do not want to spend too much time on what those
practical effects might be. We all have seen or heard of incidents of
possible vigilantism472 and, if not vigilantism, as Professor Gibbons
468 Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
"'6 Artway, 876 F. Supp. at 684. The Court stated that there are three tests for
"determining whether a statute is punitive within the context of the bill of attainder doctrine
... the historical test... the functional test... and.., the motivationaltest." Id. The Court
determined that the functional test was appropriate in the present case. Id.
470 See, e.g., id. at 672 (stating "[wihen the challenged legislation has a clear
punitive purpose the court should apply an ex post facto analysis").
411 See Sabin, supra note 425, at 345. The article notes that New Jersey Supreme
Court Justice Gary Stein, in his dissenting opinion in Doe v. Poritz, said the majority should
have taken into consideration factors used in a previous case to determine whether the Ex
Post Facto Clause was violated. Id. Instead, "the Court chose to risk unfairness to
previously convicted sex offenders over unfairnessto children and women who might suffer
due to ignorance of the offender's presence in the community." Id. at 356. Rather than apply
the factors discussed by Justice Stein, the majority looked at the legislative intent of Megan's
Law to determine it was remedial, and should be applied retroactively "to all sex .offenders."
Id. at 345.
472 E.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430. The dissent cited two newspaper accounts
of action taken against sex offenders subject to Megan's Law. Id. In one instance, a father
and son broke into the house of a sex offender and attacked the man they thought to be the
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noted, legal ostracism and harassment in the non-criminal sense.4' 3
It is interesting to note that in Doe v. Poritz,4 74 Chief Justice
Wilentz makes reference to what happened to Carlos Diaz, and said that
if this happens again, they, I guess meaning the Guardian Angels, might
likely be subject to criminal prosecution,475 citing to the New Jersey
harassment statute,476 which says that it is a misdemeanor to engage in
communications that are alarming or annoying.477
Professor Strossen, in this context, does not stress and did not
note that I am the vice president of the state board of the A.C.L.U.
Members of the media asked me whether I think that Curtis Sliwa should
be criminally prosecuted? What am I supposed to say? He was
sex offender. Id. However, "the two ended up attacking the wrong man." Id.
171 Id. While the Court granted him an injunction preventing law enforcement
officials from notifying community members of his release, "[t]he Guardian Angels, a New
York-based civilian group, organized a community protest outside the residence of Diaz's
mother." Id. The Guardian Angels ... hand[ed] out fliers "with a large photo of Diaz, the
warning 'BEWARE' in big black block letters and a phone number to call if Diaz [was]
spotted." Id. (quoting Rosemarie Ross, Rapist, Beware: Residents' Fear Turns to Anger,
REVENGE, NORTH JERSEY HERALD & NEWS, Jan. 6, 1995, at Al).
474 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995). The New Jersey Supreme Court held that two of the
bills at issue comprising part of Megan's Law, the Registration and Community Notification
Laws, are constitutional, "but that the prosecutor's decision to provide community
notification, including the manner of notification, is subject to judicial review before such
notification is given, and that such review is constitutionally required." Id. at 367.
171 Id. at 377. The majority discusses its disagreementwith the dissent's prediction
that dire consequences will certainly occur if communities are notified about "previously-
convicted sex-offenders." Id. The Court noted the two examples of harassment referred to
by the dissent, in which one has "already led to indictment and the other involves conduct
that may very well be subject to criminal sanctions if and when it occurred again." Id. The
majority further held that in the law-abiding nature of society, for the most part, families will
use notification concerning previously-convictedsex offenders to protect their children. Id.
476 N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:33-4 (West 1995).
477 Id. "[A) person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to
harass another, he: a. [m]akes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications
anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any
other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm .... Id.
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leafleting, presenting information that he validly obtained,47 and
therefore, I would be very hard put, if I want to keep my job at the
A.C.L.U., at least, to argue that that type of activity can be criminally
proscribed. It seemed to me it simply could not be, certainly not as an
alarming or annoying communication, and therein, points the difficulty.
Even if we put aside the issues of criminal activity, vigilantism,479 the
arsons, 480  and the assaults4 s8 that we have read about in the
newspapers, 482 and limit ourselves to activity that cannot be criminally
proscribed because the Constitution forbids it,4" 3 what is going to be the
effect of legal ostracism?4 4 To put it another way, is legal ostracism
478 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430. Referring to a newspaper report, the dissent
noted that Curtis Sliwa, founder of the Guardian Angels, and members of the group were
responsible for distributing flyers identifying Diaz throughout the Passaic community. Id.
"Sliwa suggested that convicted criminals deserve to be treated as outcasts and that their
ostracism would deter others." Id at 43 1; see also Megan's Law, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 1995,
at 6A (noting that a federaljudge "barred officials from notifying the community that a sex
offender had moved in, but Guardian Angel Curtis Sliwa says the order doesn't apply to
private citizens").
479 See Campbell, supra note 389, at 546-47 (listing an act of vigilantism where a
community forced a man to move out of his house). Martone, supra, note 8, at 39
(discussing two acts of vigilantism in the wake of community notification statutes).
4"0 See Campbell, supra note 389, at 546 (noting that when the local sheriffs
department notified residents in Washington that "child rapist Joseph Gallardo would be
moving into their neighborhood, his house was set on fire").
481 Id. at 546-47.
482 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 430 (listing newspaper accounts of vigilantism
taken against two sex offenders who were subject to the registration and notification
provisions).
483 See id. at 431 (explaining that the restrictions on the legislative power of the
states are founded on the belief that people will not give into their violent tendencies, and
that "the Constitutionof the United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for
the people of each state").
41 See Elizabeth Kelley Cierzniak, There Goes the Neighborhood: Notifying the
Public When a Convicted Child Molester is Released into the Community, 28 IND. L. REV.
715, 719 (1995). The author explains that while community notification prevents some
previously-convicted sex offenders from re-offending, it also results in scattered instances
ofvigilantismand harassmentagainstthese offenders. Id. Consequently,released offenders
may find themselves unable to integrate into society unless they go underground or to a
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itself an indication that what is being opposed effectively is new
punishment?4 8  The answer to that question may resolve the
constitutional issue on the Ex Post Facto Clause,'86 along with the related
Double Jeopardy Clause487 and Bill of Attainder Clause arguments.488
Among the other constitutional issues that have come up is the
substantive privacy claim.489  In that case, the constitutional
methodologythat the Supreme Court has adopted does admit to take into
account the strength of the State's interest in abridging or disclosing
personal information.49 I could see a court balancing a substantive
privacy claim the other way, even though, as Professor Gibbons noted,
the New Jersey Supreme Court did go out of its way to establish that
disclosure of personal information, such as one's home address, does
trigger a substantive privacy concern both under the federal Constitution
and under the state Constitution.4 9' The New Jersey Supreme Court in
community where they can live in anonymity. Id. As a result, public notification can be
self-defeating if offenders leave communitiesthat know about their criminal history for areas
where they are anonymous. Id.
485 See Sabin, supra note 425, at 349 (discussing Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J.,
876 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J. 1995) which held that the New Jersey notification law constituted
additional punishment because notification is Iikely to result in ostracizing the offender).
41 See, e.g., Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242. Artway challenged the registration and
notification statutes on the basis that they were unconstitutionalunder the Ex Post Facto, Bill
of Attainder and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 See Catherine A. Trinkle, Federal Standards for Sex Offender Registration:
Public Disclosure Confronts the Right to Privacy, 37 WM. & MARYL. REv. 299,309 (1995).
490 See generally Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 409-13 (discussing the balancing
method under the state constitution and that the federal Constitution is to take both the state's
interest of disclosure and the individual's right of privacy into consideration).
491 See id. at 419. However, "government dissemination of information ...
caus[ing] damage to reputation ... does not in itself state a cause of action for violation of
a constitutionalright; infringementofmore'tangible interests'.., must be alleged as well."
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Doe,492 in a ruling that, apart from the other contexts of the case, would
be considered a great boon to civil libertarians,493 found that reputation
alone was a liberty interest protected under the New Jersey State
Constitution.494 In distinction, the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation is that reputation alone is not a liberty interest.495 The
New Jersey Supreme Court, although ruling otherwise, did take great
pains to establish the existence of a palpable and, under other
circumstances, protectable interest.496
The other day I was asked by a member of the media about the
constitutionalityof a proposal from the State Treasurer: to sell driver's
license information to direct mail outfits for money as this would raise
the state ten million dollars.497 This of course includes, not just sex
offenders, but all of us, since the great majority of the citizens of New
Jersey, I would assume, have a driver's license. So put in that context,
a strong argument can be made, and has been made, that disclosure of
the type of information called for under the community notification
provision, at the very least, amounts to some abridgmentof a privacy or
liberty interest. 98
492 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
491 See generally Rafshoon, supra note 2, at 1653-54 (discussing a positivist
approach to liberty when applied to prisoners in procedural due process cases).
494 See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419.
491 "The 'stigma' resulting from the defamatory factor of the posting was doubtless
an important factor in evaluating the extent of harm worked by that act, but we do not think
that such defamation, standing alone, deprived Constantineau [the defendar] of any 'liberty'
protected by the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
49 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 419.
497 See Jeffrey Page, State Wants to Take License with DMVLists Considers Selling
Data to Advertisers; THE RECORD (New Jersey), Feb. 21, 1996, at A3. The New Jersey State
Treasurer, Brian Clymer, proposed to make the Department of Motor Vehicles lists available
to direct marketingcompanies. Id. Mr. Clymer estimated that the information could bring
in $11 million to the state. Id.
498 See generally Earl-Hubbard, supra note 4 (arguing that disclosure of certain
information can be an invasion of an individual's liberty interest). "Perhaps the offender's
criminal record is not a private matter, but his home and work addresses and phone numbers
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The third constitutional element that has been litigated is, as has
been mentioned before, the procedural due process element. 99
Originally, when Carlos Diaz"' and Alexander Artway5°' were being
subjected to registration and/or notification,"2 there was no provision for
review of the prosecutor's unilateral determination of tier classification,
no process or hearing."° Chief Justice Wilentz, °4 as a predicate to
upholding the statute, inserted an extremely comprehensive exposition
of what process would be required, and the courts and prosecutors in
New Jersey are now dealing with this new process. 5
are still within the realm of privacy encompassed under the term 'liberty.'' Id. at 841.
41 "The question treated in this section is whether in the implementation of
notification, procedural protections are required beyond those found in these laws in order
to assure fairness and accuracy in carrying them out." Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 417.
5o See Montana, supra note 180, at 604 (citing Diaz v. Whitman, slip op. at 9, No.
946376 (D. N.J. Jan. 6, 1995). Carlos Diaz was convicted for the kidnapping and sexual
assault of a twenty-year-old woman in 1983. Id. He challenged Megan's Law on the
grounds that it violated his due process and privacy rights. Id. District Court Judge John
Bissell issued a preliminary injunction preventing Passaic County law enforcement officials
from notifying community groups in the area to which Diaz planned to return after his
release from prison. Id.
'0' See Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666 (D. N.J. 1995)
(upholding the registration requirement for Alexander Artway, convicted of sodomizing a
twenty-year old woman, although sodomy was no longer illegal at the time of his
registration).
502 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-5 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996)
(providing for varying levels of community notification regarding the location of certain
convicted sex offenders, depending upon the seriousness of their crime and the likelihood
of recidivism).
50 Sabin, supra note 425, at 334 n.27 (maintainingthat prior to Doe v. Poritz, "the
public notificationprocess could take place at any time, without notice or an opportunity to
be heard by the registrant .... Since Poritz, the prosecutor must promptly notify the
registrantof the tier classificationdecision as well as his or her right to a hearing in order to
contest the decision").
4 Chief Justice Wilentz is the author of the majority opinion in Doe v. Poritz, 662
A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
. 05 Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 417-22 (examining why both fundamental fairness
and procedural due process dictate that a defendant classified as Tier Two or Tier Three must
be granted a pre-notification hearing).
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This is not a closed book, however. My observation is that a
growing administrative structure is fast becoming necessary to deal with
this process of community notification. Back in September when it was
thought that the private bar of New Jersey would have to accept
assignmentsto represent registrants in these tier classification hearings,
the bar more or less threatened to revolt." 6 There quickly came a
compromise in which the state Public Defender was given additional
funding in which to represent indigent clients in tier classifications." 7
The prosecutors, of course, are now required to designate at least one
prosecutor as a Megan's Law prosecutor."0 Each vicinage now has at
least one Megan's Law judge assigned to hear these classifications. 9 It
is imposing a cost on our system."'
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has accepted
certification on another Megan's Law case,5 ' not dealing with the
constitutional issues in Doe v. Poritz,"2 but more the procedural
" See Tom Hester, State Bar Protests Unpaid Megan Work, STAR LEDGER, Oct.
21, 1995.
507 See Michelle Ruess, State Pays for Megan's Law: $250,000 Covers Public
Defenders, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Oct. 31, 1995, at Al [hereinafter State Pays for
Megan's Law].
508 Cf Lisa L. Colangelo, Payingfor Megan's Law Backlog, ASBURY PARK PRESS,
Nov. 3, 1995, at A3 (noting that "Attorney General Poritz has told county prosecutors they
should consider using forfeiture monies to handle the backlog of cases they face under
Megan's Law").
" See 15 Judges Appointed to Hear Objections to Megan's Law, THE RECORD
(New Jersey), Aug. 24, 1995, at A3.
5 0 See generally Edward T. McHugh, Senate Oks Sex Offender Registry Plan;
Police Will Handle Queries, TELEGRAM & GAZETrE (New Jersey), May 30, 1996, at Al
(noting that "municipal officials would discourage [sex offenders] from registering to hold
down the cost to government").
"' In re C.A. 679 A.2d 1159 (1996).
52 662 A.2d 367. The Court considered the following constitutional issues
concerning the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws of New Jersey: whether
the statutes "constituted punishment." Id. at 387. Whether the statute violated Doe's right
to equal protection under the federal and state constitutins. Id. at 413. Whether the statute
violated Doe's procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 417.
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issuesP Can one use evidence of alleged criminal activity that did not
result in a conviction, for instance, in determiningthe risk of re-offense?
Last week, the Court, in fact, issued a letter to counsel which suggests
that it might get into some substantive re-evaluation of how the risk
assessment scale has been constructed. 14
All of which leads me to have this concern: we are building
structures upon structures upon structures, but we are essentially asking
lawyers, prosecutors, public defenders and judges to answer a question
that is, if it is answerable: "What is the risk of re-offense?" The answer
to that question would not seem to be answered competently simply by
a panel or a process of lawyers. Well, I will leave it there, and I will
look forward to any questions that come later.
STEPHEN NEWMAN: Thank you, Professor Chen. Our colleague,
Professor Alexander Brooks is next.
53 See, e.g., In re C.A., 679 A.2d 1153 (holding that Megan's Law permits prior
allegations of sex crimes, including those never prosecuted, to be used in a procedure to
determine the risk of re-offense).
51' See Risk Assessment Scale Manual, supra note 396. Current decision-making
about the risk of re-offense by sex offenders under the assessment scale is made by county
prosecutors, who place each offender within a "low," "moderate" or "high" tier. Id. at 1.
The placement is based on risk points accumulated by offenders depending on factors such
as the number of prior offenses, progress in therapy, community support, abstention from
drugs and the violence of any past crimes. Id. at 3.
